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In troduction 
I t is sensible to pose the question whether there is a meaningful distinction be-tween the weapons law that applies d uring international armed conflict and 
that which governs hostili ties during a non-international armed conflict. After all, 
philosophically, it could be argued that there is no rational basis for such a distinc-
tion. Why, the rhetorical question would go, should it be legitimate to expose in-
dividuals during a civil war to injuring mechanisms that have been fo und to be 
unacceptable for employment during wars between States?! If this is seen as a plea 
that the law applicable in these classes of conflict be merged, that is not the pur-
pose of this article. Rather, the intent in what follows is to consider whether there 
are in fact such differences in the law as it is, to identify the precise extent of any 
such divergences and to ask whether they make sense. 
" Air Commodore, Royal Air Force. The views expressed in this article represent the views of the 
author in his personal capacity and are not intended to reflect the views of the Royal Air Force, 
the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence or the United Kingdom government. 
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Fundamental Principles and the Conventional Weapons Convention 
So, is there still a meaningful weapons law distinction between non-international 
armed conflict and international armed conflict? Well, the fundamental principles 
prohibiting weapons that are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unneces-
sary suffering! and weapons that are indiscriminate by nature3 apply equally in 
both types of conflict. For the seventy-five States4 that have ratified the 200 I exten-
sion in scope of the Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW),5 the Conven-
tion's scope and thus that of its protocols extend to both types of conflict. 
Amended Protocol II (AP 11 )6 to the CCW always did, of course, apply to both 
categories of conflict. 7 Equally, the Chemical Weapons Convention,S the Biological 
Weapons Convention,9 the Ottawa Convention lO and the Cluster Munitions Con-
vention II were all drafted as arms control treaties in that they prohibited a range of 
activities that went significantly beyond mere use of the relevant weapons. Th us, by 
prohibiting possession of such weapons and by including undertakings to never 
under any circumstances assist, encourage or induce in any way anybody to engage 
in any activity prohibited to a State party,I 2 the use of these weapons was effectively 
prohibited in non-international as well as in international armed conflicts. 
Expanding Bullets 
It is not, however, correct to say that the whole of the rest of weapons law applies 
equally to both classes of armed conflict-indeed in certain important details that 
is not currently the case. Expanding bullets pose particular and complex issues in 
this regard. Let us therefore at this point consider that specific munition and the 
particular issues that have been brought into sharp focus as a result of a recent in-
ternational conference. 
The Kampala Review Conference for the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court adopted on June 10, 2010, by consensus, Resolution 5, which 
amended Article 8(2) (e) of the Statute. It achieved this by inserting additional of-
fenses under the heading of "other serious violations ofthe laws and customs ap-
plicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established 
framework ofinternationallaw."i3 Those additional offenses are the following: 
(xiii)Employing poison or poisoned weapons; 
(xiv) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices; 
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(xv) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as 
bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced 
with incisions.14 
The reference to "the established framework of international law" makes it clear 
that the States that adopted this provision by consensus were asserting that the 
listed activities, when conducted in the course and context of an armed contlict not 
of an international character, constitute activities that, in their view, are offenses 
only if they were committed in such a way as is prohibited by the existing frame-
work. The significance of that implicit assertion, of course, is that, SO far as those 
States are concerned, these activities constitute offenses irrespective of whether the 
perpetrator's State has ratified this addition to the Rome Statute, if the activities 
themselves breach international law and amount to war crimes. IS There would not 
appear to be any controversy about that assertion as it applies to the poison, poi-
soned weapons, asphyxiating and poisonous gas, and analogous liquids, materials 
or devices provisions. International law already prohibits the use of such weapons 
by any State in both international and non-international armed conflictsH> and we 
can safely also conclude that the use of those weapons in such conflicts is an offense 
under customary international law. 17 
However, the position in relation to expanding bullets is rather more complex. 
In negotiating the third Hague Declaration of 1899,18 the plenipotentiaries agreed 
"( t lo abstain from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the hwnan 
body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or 
is pierced with incisions. "19 When negotiated, the Declaration was subject to a gen-
eral participation clause such that it only applied to a war between States party and 
ceased to apply if a non-party State joined the conilict.20 
Hays Parks has made the point that militaries of all nations used only full-metal-
jacketed bullets before and after the adoption of the Declaration, mainly because 
they were the only ones that would function reliably when fired from military 
weapons.21 He therefore speculates whether compliance was due to law of war con-
siderations or military reliability concerns. 
But there is a wider matter to consider here. Christopher Greenwood has re-
portedly expressed doubts that the 1899 Declarat ion was customary law. He con-
sidered the matter in relation to the distinction principle. He was contemplating 
the type of expanding ammunition that may be more accurate or less likely to rico-
chet or over-penetrate than full-me tal-jacketed ammunition, thus reducing the 
risks to innocent civilians during urban or counterterrorist operations. In such cir-
cumstances, he wondered whether some increased potential for inj ury to the com-
batant or terrorist target would necessarily amount to superfluous injury. The 
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thought he was putting forward was that the protection of civilians under the prin-
ciple of distinction in those circumstances might outweigh considerations of addi-
tional injury to the targeted individual.22 
To take this analysis one stage further, in particular mili tary circumstances ex-
panding bullets may be the weapon of choice, for example, in order to stop a terrorist 
from detonating a bomb or abducting a hostage or in other similar circumstancesP 
Expanding Bullets under Customary Law 
However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (IeRC), in its Customary 
International Humanitarian Law study, finds the following rule: "The use of bullets 
which expand or flatten easily in the human body is prohibited . "2~ 
The JCRC study asserts that this customary rule applies in both international 
and non- international armed conflicts.25 One difficulty with the IeRe's formula-
tion is that the phrase "bullets which expand" can be interpreted in a number of 
ways. It could mean "bullets which are designed, or designed or adapted, in order 
to expand," or "bullets which in the normal or intended circwnstances of their use 
will normally or inevitably expand" or even "bullets which are capable of expand-
ing." While there is no doubt that there is a rule of customary law in relation to ex-
panding bullets, one may doubt that that rule has been correctly for mulated in the 
JeRC study. On balance, it would seem most likely that any such rule would be 
based on the design purpose and intent of the weapon, rather than on how it 
might behave in unspecified but perhaps particular circumstances. In short, the 
design purpose is to be preferred to the effects as the basis for any customary rule, 
which should also, the author would suggest, be linked to the superfluous injuryl 
unnecessary suffering principle in its application in both categories of conflict. 
Interestingly, the JCRC study acknowledges that several States have decided to 
use such ammunition in domestic law enforcement operations.26 Kenneth Watkin, 
in a 2006 article, indicates that rather more States have done this than the word 
"several" would indicateP The leRC asserts, however, in the customary law study 
that the use of such ammunition by police forces occurs in situations other than 
armed conflict and that the bullets are fired from firearms which deposit less en-
ergy than a rifle bullet.28 
The purpose, of course, for using such bullets in domestic law enforcement will 
usually be to stop the individual quickly and before he has the opportunity to act in 
a potentially extremely damaging way. The range and circumstances of use of the 
weapon by law enforcement officers mayor may not be different from the circum-
stances in which members of the armed forces would be inclined to use such weap-
ons. There is also, of course, the point that, for a number of countries, the weapons 
and ammunition used by members of the armed forces are likely to be substantially 
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the same as those used by the internal security or police force . The ICRC has, in its 
customary law study, frequently argued that rules that apply in international 
armed conflict in the field of weapons law also apply in non-international armed 
conflict because the weapons used by the armed forces are the same in both types of 
conflict.29 While that may not necessarily be a particularly convincing argument, 
nevertheless, it would seem illogical to take that line and then, in the next b reath, as 
it were, to suggest that different rules on expanding bullets apply as between police 
forces and armed forces units, recognizing as one must that in many States the 
weapons used, and sometimes even the users, are the same. 
Expanding Bullets at the Kampala Conference 
When the Kampala Conference delegates adopted the additions to Article 8 that we 
have been discussing, they inserted into the Resolution the following important 
preambular paragraph: 
Considering that the crime referred to in article 8, paragraph 2(e)(xv) (employing bul-
lets which expand or flatten easily in the human body), is also a serious violation of the 
laws applicable in armed conflict not of an international character, and understanding 
that the crime is committed only if the perpetrator employs the bullets to uselessly 
aggravate suffering or the wounding effect upon the target of such bullets, as reflected 
in customary international law . 30 
When we seek to interpret this paragraph, we should start by noting in a posi-
tive sense that it usefully suggests that the offense is only committed in non-
international armed conflicts if the bullets are used "to uselessly aggravate." The 
implication is, therefore, that if there is military utility attached to the additional 
injury or suffering-for example, in the sense discussed earlier-then the offense 
will not have been committed. The important question to consider is whether this 
implication is made legally effective by the language of the preamble and of the 
relevant element of crime. Of course, if this preambular language and the element 
of crime are interpreted by the Court as restricting the circumstances in which the 
use of such amm unition constitutes an offense under the Rome Statute, this 
would be of fundamental importance. In order to determine whether the 
preambular language and the element of crime are legally effective in this sense, 
we must therefore consider first the law which the Court is obliged to apply and 
thereafter the legal significance of the elements of crimes. 
Applicable Law under the Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute prescribes the law that the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
shall apply in the following terms: 
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(a) In the fi rst place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principlesand 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of the States 
that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those princi-
ples are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internation-
ally recognized norms and standards}] 
The effect of this language is that the Court is obliged to take into account the el-
ements of the crime of using expanding bullets in a non-international armed con-
fliet when interpreting that offense for the purposes of proceedings before the 
Court. Because of the effect of Article 9 of the Statute, however, the Court is not 
specifically required to apply the elements, merely to take them into account. l2 
The elements of the war crime of employing prohibited bullets are prescribed in 
paragraph 3 of Annex II to the Resolution of the Kampala Conference and, so far as 
relevant, include the following: "The perpetrator was aware that the nature of the 
bullets was such that their employment would uselessly aggravate suffering or the 
wounding effect. "33 
This language, whieh a judge of the ICC considering a prosecution for such an 
offense would be obliged to take into account, makes it clear that the offense is only 
made out if the person concerned knew that the employment of the ammunition 
would uselessly aggravate suffering or wounds. Such aggravation is not useless if 
there is a corresponding military purpose for it. This would be the case, for exam-
ple, if expanding ammunition is used to target a hostage taker, hijacker or suicide 
bomber in circumstances where the resulting instant disabling of the targeted indi-
vidual is essential to protect civilians. 
Putting that aspect to one side fo r a moment, a careful analysis of the 
preambular words may be interpreted by some as im plying that the use of such 
bullets in all circumstances in the context of a non-international armed conflict 
breaches international law. Such an interpretation may suggest the Kampala dele-
gates intended that while the prohibition applies in all circumstances during non-
international armed conflicts, the preambular caveat only apply to the offense pro-
vision. However, such a conclusion applies in the light of the more fu ndamental 
concerns discussed above. 
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Significance of the Kampala Preamble and Associated Element of the Crime 
Paragraph 3 of the elements of the crime in relation to expanding bullets is there-
fore of vital importance. It should indeed be borne in mind that established human 
rights nonns may be breached if, in circumstances other than armed conflict, the use 
of high-velocity ammunition would be less discriminating than expanding bullets, 
e.g., because of greater over-penetration or ricochet risks that needlessly put civil-
ians in the vicinity at enhanced risk. 34 
Equally, the customary principle of distinction arguably comes into play in the 
manner referred to earlier and as noted by Christopher Greenwood. Indeed, it is 
difficult to believe that customary international law should be regarded as prohib-
iting a weapon that is more likely to be effective in protecting the innocent in cir-
cumstances of acute danger than less apparently legally controversial high-velocity 
ammunition. 
Returning to the broader theme of this article, the main point to note is that ex-
panding bullets seem to represent a limited point of distinction between the law 
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts. In international 
armed conflict the offense under the Rome Statute is also tied to superfluous injury 
and unnecessary suffering by the application of a similar element of crime to that 
appearing in the annex to the Kampala Resolution. However, the treaty prohibi-
tion, which, as we have seen, applies only in the case of international armed con-
flicts, make no such reference to superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.35 
Equally, it remains to be seen what approach the ICC will adopt in interpreting the 
Resolution, in particular with respect to the words of the preamble and of the ele-
ment of the crime. While the 1969 Vienna Convention's rules on interpretation of 
treaties}/; would suggest the need to interpret the main body of the Resolution by 
reference to the preambular words as text adopted by the participants at the Con-
ference, there can be no certainty that a Court, confronted by proceedings under 
the Statute for an offense alleged to have been committed in a non-international 
armed conflict, will do SO.31 
Extension of the Scope of the Conventional Weapons Convention 
The CCW provides another point of difference between the law applicable in inter-
national and that in non-international armed conflicts that, although fairly obvi-
ous, is nevertheless worthy of mention-namely, that the CCW protocols (other 
than AP II) apply equally to both classes of conflict only for States that have ratified 
the relevant protocol and the 200 1 extension of scope. For the States that have not 
ratified the scope extension, protocols to which that State is party will continue 
only to apply in international armed conflicts. This has the equally obvious result 
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that fewer States are bound by those rules with respect to non -international armed 
conflict, which may, but will not necessarily, have the effect that the achievement of 
a customary rule based on the language of a particular protocol may happen more 
quickly in respect to international than non -international armed confli ct. This 
would clearly suggest that the ICRC should have been rather more hesitant when 
finding customary weapons law rules applying in non-international anned conflict 
based on the relatively recently adopted CCW protocols and on the CCW exten-
sion of scope. 
The Natural Environment 
Something should be said about the natural environment. Under the Convention 
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifi-
cation Techniques (ENMOD ),38 States party undertake not to engage in milital)' or 
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having wide-
spread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury 
to any other State party)9 If the technique is not employed by a State party or if the 
destruction, damage or injury is not applied to another State party, it is at face value 
hard to see how this provision is engaged. Accordingly, this would seem to be an-
other treaty provision that applies in armed conflicts between States but not in an 
armed conflict that is internal to a single State. 
While the ENMOD was concerned with the use of the environment as a 
weapon, the focus of Articles 35 and 55 of 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP 1)40 was 
on collateral damage to the environment resulting from an attack directed at some 
other objective. These articles apply to weapons and means of warfare and, thus, 
are also provisions that form part of the law of weaponry. It is well understood that 
these provisions are one of the reasons for the U.S. decision not to ratify the 
treaty.41 
Putting that to one side, the fact remains that for States that are party to AP I, the 
treaty rules apply only in an international armed conflict. The ICRC in Rule 43 
of its Customary lntertlational Humanitarian Law study suggests that there are 
rules that protect the environment as a matter of customary law and that these 
rules apply in international and in non-international armed conflict.42 In the same 
rule the ICRC finds an additional sub-rule requiring that methods and means of 
warfare must be employed with due regard for the protection and preservation of 
the natural environment. The rule goes on to require that in the conduct of mili-
tary operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid and, in any event, to 
minimize incidental damage to the environment.43 The ICRC adds as a further ele-
ment to the rule that a party to the conflict is not absolved from taking such 
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precautions by lack of scientific certainty as to the environmental effects of certain 
military operations. In the associated commentary, however, the editors conclude 
that while State practice supports the conclusion that these are customary rules 
applicable in international armed conflicts, their status as customary rules in 
non-international armed conflicts is "arguable." So, while it is clear that there is a 
difference in the application of the treaty rules, the position at customary law is the 
subject of some controversy. 
Weapons Procurement and Expanding Bullets 
Given budgetary constraints on weapons procurement by States, it is foreseeable 
that weapons procured for law enforcement purposes will increasingly be made 
available for use by armed forces personnel, such use being not necessarily re-
stricted to a law enforcement context. The author acknowledges that the custom-
ary nature of the expanding bullets prohibition was readily and widely accepted 
until relatively recently. However, the advent in more recent years of certain re-
sponses to asymmetric inferiori ty, such as aircraft hijacking, suicide bombing, hos-
tage taking or command detonation of devices directed at civilian infrastructure 
targets, is Hable to render expanding ammunition the weapon of choice fo r police 
or armed forces personnel seeking to respond effectively to such challenges. Such 
asymmetric activity may be criminal in nature, or it may foreseeably be employed 
by or at the direction of a party to an armed conflict, for example, a State, in fur-
therance ofits strategic war aims. It seems most unlikely, however, that a less effec-
tive response than expanding ammunition will be employed by States simply 
because the particular context may be regarded as hostilities associated with an in-
ternational armed conflict. Equally, it is inconceivable that the authorities will 
pause in what is likely to be an urgent, highly charged and dangerous situation in 
order to debate the existence and status of any associated armed conflict and, thus, 
the nature of the applicable rule. 
If States in any significant number do retain expanding amm unition fo r use in 
the context of international armed conflict in the sense discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs, or indeed if such use occurs on any regular basis, the continued exis-
tence of the customary rule will become, at the very least, questionable and, per-
haps, unsustainable. States party to the 1899 Declaration would, of course, remain 
bound thereby. Arguably, however, practice of States party to the Declaration that 
is contrary to its provisions would be rather potent evidence that the treaty is being 
overtaken by events, a d rcwnstance not unknown in the law of weaponry.44 
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Do These Differences Make Sense! 
Now that we have established that differences in the law applicable in our two 
classes of conflj ct exist, the final question to pose is whether such differences make 
sense. Here we return to the issue posed at the beginning of this short piece. 
Should, indeed, the law that is designed to limit the sufferings of combatants and to 
seek to ensure that the law of distinction is properly complied with differ between 
conflicts confined to a State and confljcts not so confined? But perhaps that is the 
wrong question. Alternative, and perhaps altogether more revealing, questions are 
these: 
• How long will it be before all States party to the CCW ratify the 200 1 scope 
extension? 
• How long before the thinking that underpins ENMon is seen by States to be 
equally applicable when the confli ct occurs within the boundaries of a single nation? 
• How long before the points we have discussed in relation to expanding bul-
lets are seen to have resonance in international and non-international armed con-
flict, not just in relation to the Rome Statute offenses? 
• And how long before States that accept the environmental rules in AP I do so 
with regard to both classes of conflict? 
States are and will remain in charge of the process of creating international law 
and it is States that therefore will determine the answers to these questions. Legal 
developments in recent years as noted above suggest that the process of leg a! con-
vergence is under way. It will, however, be for individual States to decide whether 
to regard that process as complete. 
In conclusion, while the general trend seems to be toward convergence, achiev-
ing complete convergence would require a collective willingness among States and 
the limited adjustment of some detailed legal interpretations. It remains to be seen 
whether States see this as a priori ty and whether State practice develops so as to 
bring about complete convergence. 
Notes 
I. Indeed, elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it pre-
posterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in anned conflicts between 
themselves be allowed when States try to put down rebeUion by their own nationals 
on their own territory. What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in interna-
tional wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife . ... 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT -94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, 1 119 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
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2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of international Armed Conflicts art . 35.2, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.5. 3 
(hereinafter AP i l (KIt is prohibited to employ weapons. projectiles and material and methods of 
warfare of a na ture to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering~ ) . This is a rule of cus· 
tomary law which therefore binds all Sta tes and which the international Committee of the Red 
Cross customary law study found to apply in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw, Rule 70 at 237 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study] . Under the rule, the 
legitimacy of a weapon must be determined by comparing the nature and scale of the generic 
military advantage to be anticipated from the use of the weapon in the applications for which it is 
designed to be used with the pattern of injury and suffering associated with the normal, intended 
use of the weapon. &e further William J. Fenrick, The Conventional Wropons Convention: A 
Modest but Useful Treaty, 279 INTERNATIONAL REVIEw OFTHE RED CROSS 498, 500 ( 199Q); W. 
Hays Parks, Means and Methods of Warfare, 38 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATtONAL LAW 
REVIEW 511, 517 n.25 (2006); WIlliAM H. BooTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAw OF ARM:ED 
CONFUCf 55-68 (2009). 
3. The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is restated in Article 51(4) of Additional Proto· 
coi l. The innovation of that provision was to spell out what indiscriminate attacks are, namely: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a 
specific mil itary objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be 
limited as required by (thel Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a 
nature to strike military objectives and civil ians or civilian objects without distinction. 
AP I, supra note 2. 
This rule is also reflective of customary law and was found by the lCRC study to apply in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts. See ICRC Study, supra note 2, Rule 71 at 
244. It is really paragraphs (b) and (c) in the treaty text that provide the rule as it applies in weap-
ons law. 
4. JCRC Treaty Database, httpJ/www.icrc.orglJHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treatiesiSFile/ 
IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf (last visited March 22, 2012). 
5. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weap. 
ons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 
10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. The Convention, on adoption, applied to international armed con· 
fl icts covered by Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. By virtue of an extension 
in scope agreed to at the 2001 CCW Review Conference, the Convention and its protocols now 
apply, for the States that ratify the extension, to the non-international armed conflicts referred to 
in Common Article 3 to the 1949 Conventions. 
6. Amended Protocol on Prohibi tions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps 
and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II ), May 3,1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-1 (1997). See 
Alicia H . Petrarca, An Impetus of Human Wreckage?: The 1996Amended Landmines Protocol, 27 
CAliFORNIA WI'STERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 205 (1996). 
7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1 (2), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609. 
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8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter 
Chemical Weapons Conventionj. 
9. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of 
Bacteria] (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972,26 U.S.T. 
583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
10. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti- Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997,2056 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter 
Ottawa Convention j. 
II. Convention on Cluste-r Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 
357 (2008) . 
12. See, e.g., Ottawa Convention, supra note 10, art. l( 1 He). 
13. Rome Statute- of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(e), July 17, 1998,2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute j. 
14. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 
Uganda, May 31-June II, 2010, Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome- Statute, RC/Res.5, Annex 
I (June 16,2010), available at http://www.icc·cpiintJiccdocslasp_docsIResolutionslRC-Res.5-ENG 
.pdf (hereinafter Article- 8 Amendmentsl. 
15. The author is grateful to Professor Charles Garraway, a member of the UK delegation to 
the Rome Diplomatic Conference, for his clarification of th is issue. 
16. ICRC Study, supra note 2, Rule 72 at 251, RuJe 74 at 259. 
17. Howeve-r, riot control agents are prohibited as a method of warfare, but their use remains 
lawful when, d uring an armed conflict, international or otherwise, they are not being used as a 
method of warfare. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 8, art . 5. 
18. Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 1 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (Supp. ) 157, 157-59 (1907) [hereinafter Expanding Bullets 
Declarationl. 
19. See id., first ope-rative paragraph. 
20. The- second and th ird operative paragraphs of the Expanding Bullets Declaration, id., 
provide: "The present Declaration is only binding for the contracting Powers in the case of a war 
between two or more of them. It shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between 
the contracting Powe-rs, one of the belligerents is joined by a non-contracting power. n 
21. W . Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 55, 69 (2005). 
22. Comments attributed to Professor Greenwood during a keynote speech at Legal Aspects 
of Current Regulations, Third International Workshop on Wound Ballistics (Mar. 2S-29, 2001), 
reported by Parks, id. at 89-90 n.23. 
23. BooTHBY, supra note 2, at 147 n.4. 
24. JCRC Study, supra note 2, Rule 77 at 268. 
25. [d. 
26. Id. at 270. 
27. Kenneth Watkin, Chemical Agents and Expandillg Bullets: Limited Law Enforcement Ex-
ceptions or Unwarranted Handcuffs?, 36 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RJGHTS 43, 52 (2006). 
28. JCRC Study, supra note 2, at 270. It is worth noting that the UK's ManlUll of the Law of 
Armed Conflict does not list expanding bullets among the weapons prohibi ted in non-international 
armed conflicts, although weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffer· 
ing are so listed. UNITED KI NGDOM MINISTRY Of DEfENCE, THE MANUAL Of THE LAw OF 
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